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Abstract
This paper analyzes the effects of population aging on the preferred
legal retirement age. What is revealed is the crucial role that the indi-
rect ’macro’ effects resulting from a change in the legal retirement age
play in the optimal decision. Two Social Security systems are stud-
ied. Under a defined contribution scheme aging lowers the preferred
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legal retirement age. However, under a defined pension scheme the
retirement age is delayed. This result shows the relevance of correctly
choosing the parameter affected by the dependency ratio in the design
of the Social Security programme.
JEL classification: H55, J26
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1. Introduction
Reforms of Social Security systems are now one of the main issues on
the economic policy agenda of most industrialized countries. It is widely
considered that, unless serious changes take place, the aging of the popu-
lation implying a rise in the number of retirees relative to that of workers
will threaten the viability of Pay-As-You-Go public pension systems in the
long-run. However, it may be said that this is not a financial problem but
a political one (see Cremer and Pestieau 2000). The threat of aging can
be neutralized by raising taxes, cutting benefits or/and delaying the age
of retirement. Indeed, this latter reform is one of the policy conclusions of
Maintaining Prosperity in an Ageing Society, OECD (1998) ”...a direct way
to encourage people to work longer would be to raise the pensionable age”.
But delaying the retirement age may not be very popular among people.
According to recent surveys, most of workers tend to manifest that they are
happy with the current retirement age (see Cremer and Pestieau 2003) which
suggests that reforms on the legal retirement age have currently become a
very delicate matter for governments.
In this paper, we aim at providing an analysis of the preferred legal re-
tirement age and how this is affected by the population aging. Using a
life-cycle model we calculate the optimal legal retirement age and examine
its relationship with the population growth rate via the dependency ratio.
We contribute two main findings to the existing literature on Social Security
and retirement. First, we highlight the indirect macro effects resulting from
altering the legal retirement age, that is, the effects on the aggregate con-
straint of the adjustment made in the ratio of workers and retirees when the
legal retirement age is lowered/delayed.
This crucial role is stressed when we compare our results with those ob-
tained by Sheshinski (1978). In Sheshinski’s model, the individual ignores
the impact of her decision on the Social Security budget constraint, as she
only optimizes her own retirement age. So, under a defined pension scheme
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a reduction in the birth rate leads to a lower individual optimal retirement
age. But when we analyze the preferred legal retirement age and these effects
are taken into account, we find the opposite result. The optimal response to
a population aging will be to postpone the retirement age.
Secondly, we also seek to underline the importance of correctly choosing
the parameter affected by the dependency ratio in order to make the retire-
ment age reform easier. Depending on the policy reaction, the aging of the
population may affect the contribution rate or the pension benefits. That
is, the demographic effects of a decrease in the population growth rate may
lead, via changes in the dependency ratio, to higher contribution rates or to
lower pension benefits. Consequently, we distinguish two Social Security pro-
grammes. First, a defined contribution scheme where the contribution rate
is constant and pension benefits are affected by the dependency ratio, and
secondly, a defined pension scheme where population aging leads to higher
contribution rates and thus the pension is the constant parameter.
The term ’legal retirement age’ usually refers to the age at which benefits
are available. However, since there are also strong incentives to stop working
after this standard entitlement age, we consider legal retirement in this model
as the age at which workers are obliged to leave the labor force, that is, as a
mandatory retirement. Indeed, in some countries there are direct restrictions
on work beyond the standard age (in Portugal and Spain entitlement to pen-
sion benefits beyond the standard age is conditional on complete withdrawal
from work), or, frequently, individuals have to leave their current jobs to
receive their pensions (see Blondal and Scarpetta 1998,or Gruber and Wise
1999). So, we can observe that the average retirement age in some OECD
countries, such as the United Kingdom, Portugal and Ireland (see Blondal
and Scarpetta 1998) is very close to this standard retirement age.1
Many studies have analyzed the relationship between retirement and So-
cial Security. Earlier literature has mainly focussed on the effect of the intro-
duction of a pension system on the individual retirement decision (see among
others Sheshinski 1978, Crawford and Lilien 1981, Kahn 1988, or Fabel 1994).
There is also more recent literature dealing with the retirement decision in
a political economy environment (see Casamatta et al. 2005 or Conde-Ruiz
and Galasso 2003 and 2004). Related to our study, Conde-Ruiz et al. (2003)
provide a long-term perspective on individual retirement behavior. They de-
velop an overlapping generations model where they examine how incentives
to retire early are affected by the pension system. They suggest that non-
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actuarially fair pension systems may induce rational agents to retire early. In
a similar framework, Conde-Ruiz et al. (2005) also find that aging may lead
to earlier retirement. Unlike the present analysis, both these studies focus on
the individual decision and only consider the defined contribution scheme.
Crettez and Le Maitre (2002) also examine how the population growth rate
affects the optimal retirement age, but in a different context. In an over-
lapping generations model without explicit Social Security variables, neither
an explicit contribution rate nor explicit pension benefits, they analyze in-
tergenerational optimal resource sharing when a social planner can choose
the retirement age in addition to consumption and investment. They find
that the optimal retirement age depends on the elasticity of substitution of
old agents’ labour for young agents’ labour and on the chosen social welfare
function.
To our knowledge our study is the first attempt to provide a theoretical
analysis of the effect of the population growth rate on the preferred legal
retirement age, and how this effect may be completely different depending
on the type of Pay-As-You-Go Social Security system in place, that is, if it
is a defined contribution system or a defined pension system.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 the model is developed. In
Section 3 the optimal legal retirement age is obtained and the relationship
between this optimal legal retirement age and the population growth rate is
examined. In Section 4 we allow the interest rate to exceed the population
growth rate in order to obtain some additional insight and we use a numerical
example to illustrate the results. Section 5 contains the conclusions reached.
2. The model
We consider a small open economy in which individuals live exactly T
years, of which the first R years represent working life. The population
consists of identical agents, and can thus be represented by a single agent.
We assume that the individual has a stationary and temporally indepen-
dent utility function, which is separable and strictly increasing in consump-















where cti is the consumption at period t in scheme i. The utility of con-
sumption is twice differentiable with u0 > 0 and u00 < 0 for all cti. Let l
t be
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the leisure at period t, the utility of leisure being v (lt) = 0, while working,
and v (lt) = v, while retired.2 This utility function is similar to Crawford
and Lilien (1981) and Sheshinski (1978). In addition, we assume that the
coefficient of relative risk aversion, ρr(c), is non-increasing and less than one.
The agent plans consumption, savings and retirement to maximize the
discounted value of utility subject to her lifetime budget constraint. She is
assumed to earn a constant stream of wage per unit of time, normalized to
unity, for the sake of simplicity, until she retires. Later, from a Social Security
programme hτ , pi , she receives a constant stream of pension benefits per unit
of time, p, τ being the Social Security contribution rate. The amount of
hours spent working cannot be varied as it is institutionally set. Therefore,
the only way utility coming from leisure can be modified is by changing the
legal retirement age.
We consider a perfectly competitive capital market with free lending and
borrowing at a fixed interest rate, which is equal to the subjective discount
rate (δ = r). This assumption together with the separability and concavity
of the utility function implies constant consumption in all periods, that is,
cti = ci for any t. We also assume a constant birth rate, n, equal to the
interest rate, n = r.
Thus, the indirect utility function of an individual over her life-cycle can
be reduced to










(1− e−rT )((1− e
−rR) + φi) (3)
is the constant consumption per unit of time, φi being the discounted
present value of net benefits from Social Security under each scheme.
In order to analyze the demographic effects, let us consider a steady-state
situation in which population is growing at a constant rate, n. As seen in






The Social Security Programme is financed through the Pay-As-You-Go
scheme where pensions of retirees are paid by working people through taxes.
So, since the government budget is instantaneously balanced, we can obtain
the following relationship between the contribution rate, pension benefits and
the legal retirement age
(1− e−nR)τ = (e−nR − e−nT )p. (5)
3. Retirement age and population aging
Let us now study how the optimal legal retirement age of the individual
is affected by a decrease in the birth rate and how these effects are different
depending on the Social Security system in place. We focus only on the effect
of a birth rate reduction, since its importance will be larger when the baby-
boom generation of the last century enters retirement in the third decade
of this century (see Weizsäcker 1991). It should be stressed that we study a
steady-state economy with different birth rates, that is, we are not concerned
with the transition period from a steady state with a determined population
growth rate to another steady state with a different one.3
In the constant pension benefits system, the contribution rate is residually
determined to balance the budget.4 This implies that under this scheme
the benefits formula does not depend on the retirement age. On the other
hand, in the constant contribution scheme, the pension is the parameter
residually obtained through the budget constraint. Therefore, from (5) we
obtain respectively
τ(R,n, p) =
(e−nR − e−nT )
(1− e−nR) p (6)
and
p(R, n, τ) =
(1− e−nR)
(e−nR − e−nT )τ . (7)
Consequently, the discounted present value of net benefits from Social Secu-
rity under each system is respectively
φp = p
µ
(e−rR − e−rT )− (1− e−rR)(e








(e−rR − e−rT ) (1− e
−nR)




Notice that an increase in the legal retirement age reduces the absolute value
of φp but it augments the absolute value of φτ .
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It can easily be verified that the utility function (2) is single-peaked for
both pension schemes. So, we can obtainR∗p andR
∗
τ , the preferred legal retire-
ment age with constant pension and with constant contribution, respectively.
Analyzing the sign of ∂R∗p/∂n and ∂R
∗
τ/∂n, the following proposition can be
stated.
Proposition 1 i) Under the constant pension system, the lower the birth
rate, the higher the preferred legal retirement age, that is, ∂R∗p/∂n < 0.
ii) Under the constant contribution system, the lower the birth rate, the
lower the preferred legal retirement age, that is, ∂R∗τ/∂n > 0.
Proof: See appendix.
The first point of the proposition tells us that in a defined pension scheme
a population aging would imply a delay in the optimal legal retirement age.
This result can be explained by the income and the substitution effect.
The income effect tends to delay retirement. A lower population growth
rate implies a higher dependency ratio. This increases the contribution rate
which reduces individuals’ lifetime income. The loss of income implies a lower
demand for leisure which means a delay in the legal retirement age.
In order to explain the substitution effect, let us compare the result of
the first point of this proposition with that obtained by Sheshinski (1978) in
a similar setting to our constant pension scheme, in the sense that a decrease
in the birth rate affects the contribution rate but the replacement ratio stays
constant.
In the aforementioned paper, Sheshinski analyzes the optimal retirement
decision and how it changes with reference to some parameters. He finds that
higher population growth rates lead to increases in the equilibrium retirement
age. In that case, the income effect lowers the retirement age. The higher
population growth rate reduces the dependency ratio which decreases the
contribution rate. Therefore, the increase in the lifetime income leads to a
higher demand for leisure. On the contrary, the substitution effect generates
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incentives to delay the retirement age. A lower contribution rate implies an
increase in the net wage. Hence, the price of leisure rises and individuals
relocate their demand from leisure to consumption. This means that the
substitution effect causes individuals to postpone their retirement age. Since
the total effect increases the equilibrium retirement age, it can be concluded
that the substitution effect outweighs the income effect.
However, the sign of the substitution effect and, consequently, the positive
relationship between the population growth rate and the optimal retirement
age in Sheshinski’s model heavily relies on the assumption that individuals ig-
nore the impact of their decision on the aggregate constraint. In other words,
individuals consider that their retirement decision only affects the length of
their working period and they ignore their influence on the dependency ra-
tio and, therefore, on the contribution rate. In Sheshinski’s model, this is
a plausible assumption since individuals optimize their own retirement age
under competitive conditions. But since in our model we analyze the optimal
legal retirement age, the macro effects on the dependency ratio of changes in
the legal retirement age cannot be ignored.
Returning to our model, under a constant pension scheme the changes
in the legal retirement age affect individuals’ lifetime income in two ways:
fixing the length of the working period and determining the contribution rate
via the dependency ratio. For instance, a delay in the legal retirement age
not only increases the working period but also reduces the contribution rate
by decreasing the dependency ratio.
Furthermore, the larger the contribution rate, the bigger the indirect
effect on the net wage of a change in the legal retirement age will be. The
reason is the higher relative weight of the contribution rate on the individual’s
net wage. Consequently, the increase in the contribution rate caused by
the population aging augments the importance of these indirect effects. In
other words, population aging increases the relative price of leisure so that
individuals relocate their demand from leisure to consumption. Hence, the
substitution effect also means that individuals delay their retirement age. So,
under a defined pension scheme both the substitution and the income effects
are in the same direction, leading to a higher legal retirement age.
The opposite results between Sheshinski’s model and our setting highlight
the crucial role of the indirect macro effects of changes in the legal retirement
age. And these play such an important role, that, when they are taken into
8
account, a decrease in the population growth rate will imply, under a defined
pension scheme, an unambiguous delay in the optimal legal retirement age.
The second point of the proposition states that under a defined contribu-
tion scheme population aging would lower the optimal legal retirement age.
This result can again be explained by the income and the substitution effect.
The income effect is similar to the previous one. The higher dependency
ratio caused by the change in the ageing structure of the population decreases
pension benefits. So, the reduction in individuals’ lifetime income comes now
from these lower pension benefits. The loss of income again implies a lower
demand for leisure which means a delay in the legal retirement age.
However, under a defined contribution scheme the substitution effect is in
the opposite direction. Under this scheme changes in the legal retirement age
also affect individuals’ lifetime income in two ways. First, fixing, as in the
previous case, the length of the working period, and secondly, determining
the pension benefits via the dependency ratio.
The lesser the pension benefits, the smaller the indirect effect on the
lifetime income of a change in the legal retirement age. The reason is the lower
relative weight of the pension benefits on the individuals’ lifetime income.
Consequently, the reduction in the pension benefits caused by the population
aging decreases the importance of these indirect effects.
In other words, population aging reduces the relative price of leisure so
that individuals relocate their demand from consumption to leisure. Hence,
the substitution effect leads to a lowering of the retirement age. So, under
a defined pension scheme, since the substitution effect outweighs the income
effect, a decrease of the birth rate will lower the optimal legal retirement age.
The economic intuition behind this proposition is the following. When
the birth rate decreases, the rate of return of the PAYG pension system also
decreases.6 As a consequence, individuals may have incentives to limit the
size of the system and to rely more heavily on private savings. This can
be achieved by delaying the legal retirement age under the constant pension
system, which would reduce the contribution rate, and lowering it under the
constant contribution system, which would reduce the pension benefits.
It is worthwhile noting that if we compare these optimal legal retirement
ages with the preferred individual retirement age in the absence of a Social
Security system, it can be deduced that the population aging would place
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this individual retirement age between the two legal ones. The reasoning is
the following. The optimal retirement age for an individual in the absence
of Social Security is equal to the preferred legal one in the case in which
r = n since in that case net benefits from Social Security would be zero.
The constant consumption (3) would be the same with or without a pension
programme and so would the optimal retirement age.7 But, as we have seen
above, population aging would lead to a delay in the optimal legal retirement
age under a defined pension scheme, placing it beyond the individual optimal
one in the absence of Social Security or to a lowering of the legal retirement
age if the system has a defined contribution rate, in which case the legal
retirement age would be below the individual optimal one in the absence of
a pension programme.
4. Extension: Allowing the interest rate to exceed
the population growth rate
For simplicity, all the previous analysis has been made under the assump-
tion that the interest rate must be equal to the population growth rate. Since
the most empirically relevant case is when r > n, in this extension we relax
the aforementioned assumption.
When the interest rate exceeds the population growth rate, the analytical
treatment becomes intractable. The former relationships between the birth
rate and optimal legal retirement ages under each scheme cannot be mathe-
matically proved. Instead, we proceed to calculate the optimal values of the
legal retirement age for some alternative levels of n. These calculations are
presented in the following subsection.
Even so, an interesting result arises in the case in which the real interest
rate is allowed to be higher than the population growth rate. This holds for
any strictly concave utility function.8
Proposition 2 Let r > n. Let the indirect utility function U(R;n) be strictly






This proposition states that if the interest rate is larger than the popula-
tion growth rate, and if the contribution rate were the same, irrespective of
the scheme, then, the higher optimal legal retirement age would be reached
under the defined pension scheme. The reasoning is the following. When
10
the interest rate exceeds the birth rate the discounted present values of net
benefits from Social Security, (8) and (9), are negative.9 In that case, the
smaller the relative weight of the pension system in the lifetime income, the
better individuals will be. As mentioned above, this reduction is achieved
by delaying the legal retirement age in a defined pension scheme, since this
implies a lower contribution rate, and lowering the legal retirement age in
a defined contribution scheme, since this results in lower pension benefits.
These reductions in the Social Security forced savings would be compensated
by voluntary savings and individuals would improve their utility levels.
Again, if we compare these optimal legal retirement ages with the pre-
ferred individual retirement age in the absence of a Social Security system, it
can be deduced that this latter would be placed between the two legal ones.
The same previous reasoning can be applied.
4.1 Numerical Example
In this numerical example we allow the interest rate to be higher than the
population growth rate and calculate the optimal legal retirement age under
each scheme for alternative values of n. We use the square root function,
u(c) =
√
c. The results are summarized in table 1:
Table 1
In the first two columns, it can be seen how under a defined pension
scheme the optimal legal retirement age is delayed almost 10 years due to
the decrease in the birth rate from 0.0135 to 0.0115. However, under a defined
contribution scheme, the same population aging leads to a lowering of the
optimal legal retirement age of more than a year.10 This difference is caused
by the opposite substitution effects embedded in each scheme.
These contrary substitution effects imply that under the defined pension
scheme the income and the substitution effects are in the same direction,
but under the defined contribution case these effects are opposite. This
explains the great impact of the aging of the population on the optimal legal
retirement age when pension benefits are constant, in contrast with the lower
impact when the contribution rate is the constant parameter. Indeed, when
the interest rate exceeds the population growth rate it cannot be assured
that the relationship between n and R∗τ is always positive.
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It has to be underlined that for n = 0.0135 individuals face the same con-
tribution rate and the same pension benefits under both schemes for R = 40,
so, the numerical example also shows the result stated in the last proposition.
The optimal legal retirement age in the case of a constant contribution rate,
R∗τ = 40, is smaller than the optimal retirement age in the case of constant
pension benefits, R∗p = 46.86.
5. Conclusions
This paper analyzes the effects of population aging on the preferred legal
retirement age. The opposite results obtained in the two pension schemes
highlight the importance of which parameter has to be affected by the de-
pendency ratio in order to involve a lower degree of compulsion in the reform
of the legal retirement age. If the dependency ratio modifies the contribution
rate, a population aging would generate an income and a substitution effect
that would lead to a delay in the preferred legal retirement age, which might
make retirement age reform easier.
The importance of the indirect macro effects of changing the legal re-
tirement age is also stressed by comparing our result in the defined pension
case, higher preferred legal retirement age related to lower birth rate, with
Sheshinski’s (1978) result, lower preferred individual retirement age related
to lower birth rate.
Summing up, our results suggest that if governments want to delay the
legal retirement age, in order to make the future reforms easier, it would
be better to transfer the effects of the aging of the population onto the




i) We have to prove that ∂R∗p/∂n is negative. It can easily be checked
that ∂2U/∂R2 is negative evaluated atR = R∗p. Therefore, the sign of ∂R
∗
p/∂n
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(e−rR − e−rT )
(1− e−rT ) . (11)
First, ∂cp/∂R and ∂cp/∂n are strictly positive: an increase in R augments
the working period and reduces the contribution rate, both effects imply
higher consumption; an increase in n reduces the dependency ratio and so
the contribution rate, this effect also implies higher consumption.












It is easy to check that:
1− e−nR − nR < 0 ∀ nR ∈ (0,∞) (13)
and therefore ∂(∂cp/∂R)/∂n < 0. Q.E.D.
ii) We have to prove that ∂R∗τ/∂n > 0. It is easy to check that (2) is
strictly concave, therefore the sign of ∂R∗τ/∂n also coincides with the sign of
(10).
The constant consumption cτ is:
cτ =
(1− e−rR)
(1− e−rT )(1− τ) + τ
(1− e−nR)
(e−nR − e−nT )
(e−rR − e−rT )
(1− e−rT ) . (14)
Again ∂cτ/∂R and ∂cτ/∂n are strictly positive: an increase in R aug-
ments the working period and raises pension benefits, both effects imply
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higher consumption; an increase in n reduces the dependency ratio and thus
augments pension benefits, this effect also implies higher consumption.
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It is easy to check that:
en(T−R) − (n(T −R) + 1) > 0 ∀ n(T −R) ∈ (0,∞) . (16)
Therefore, since ∂ (∂c/∂R) /∂n > 0, the next step is to prove that the
positive part of (10) is larger than the negative part.





























Since we are evaluating at n = r, after some simplifications, the LHS of
(18) can be reduced to the following expression:
LHS =
(enR − 1)(enT − 1)(enT − enR(1 + n(T −R))
(enT − enR)n (R(enT − 1)− T (enR − 1)) . (19)
It can be shown numerically by means of a mathematical programme that
LHS > 1 for any n ∈ (0, 1) and for any R ∈ (0, T ). Indeed, the mathematical
programme runs results lower than one for values of R very close to 0. So,
we should impose a lower bound on R, although almost no restrictive, for
instance R ∈ (T/100, T ). Q.E.D.
Proof Proposition 2
We have to prove that with strictly concave indirect utility functions, if
















)− e−rRv = 0. (20)








If this inequality holds, the single-peakness property of the utility function
implies that R∗p > R
∗










(1− e−rT )(1− e−nR) (22)
+
pne−nR(1− e−rR)(e−nR − e−nT )
(1− e−rT )(1− e−nR)2 −
pre−rR





(1− e−rT )(1− τ) +
τne−nR(e−rR − e−rT )
(1− e−rT )(e−nR − e−nT ) (24)
+
τne−nR(1− e−nR)(e−rR − e−rT )
(1− e−rT )(e−nR − e−nT )2 −
p(n, τ ,R∗τ )re
−rR
(1− e−rT ) (25)
Given that for R = R∗p, τ(n, p,R
∗
p) = τ and p(n, τ ,R
∗
p) = p, we only have
to compare the second and the third addends. In the defined pension scheme
τ(R,n, p) =
(e−nR − e−nT )
(1− e−nR) p (26)
We know that τ = τ(n, p,R∗p). So, substituting (26) in (24) and (25),that is,
the constant contribution τ for its value, and comparing the two derivatives,
we obtain that (21) holds if:
(e−nR − e−nT )
(1− e−nR) >
(e−rR − e−rT )
(1− e−rR) . (27)
The inequality (27) will be true for r > n since the dependency ratio is
decreasing with respect to the population growth rate. Q.E.D.
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Notes
1If there is a possibility of early access to pension benefits with some adjustment to
the value of retirement benefits, the average retirement age is usually found between this
age at which pensions can be accessed and the standard retirement age. See Blondal and
Scarpetta (1998) or Samwick (1998).
2In a further analysis, we shall extend the model to the more general case where the
utility of leisure may not be independent of age. That is, the utility of leisure while retired
will be v(lt) = v(t) with v0(t) > 0.
3Our analysis should be interpreted from a long-run perspective.
4Since 0 < τ(n) < 1, then 0 < p < (1−e
−nR)
(e−nR−e−nT ) .
5Obviously, this is so when the interest rate is different to the birth rate. If r = n, the
Social Security is actuarially fair as the present value of Social Security benefits is equal
to the present value of contributions. In other words, net benefits from the pension system
are equal to zero, and therefore, changes in the legal retirement age are neutral.
6Notice the different effect of changes in n or r on the optimal decision. While a
variation in the interest rate would affect the discount present value of the entire lifetime
income, a change in the population growth rate would only affect either the working period
or the retirement period depending on the defined parameter of the Social Security.
7The actuarially fair system in the case of r = n would be completely equivalent to
private savings. So, in our context of certain lifetimes and perfect capital markets individ-
uals would only have to replace private savings with public savings if the contribution rate
is not set at their desired level. See Crawford and Lilien (1981) for an extensive analysis
of the effect of a pension system on the retirement decision when the three commonly
maintained assumptions - perfect capital markets, actuarial fairness and certain lifetimes-
are relaxed.
8When the interest rate is higher than the birth rate, r > n, the single-peakness
property of the indirect utility function U(c,R) cannot be guaranteed for any value of the
interest and birth rates.
9This means that the pension system creates intergenerational redistribution.
10These optimal retirement ages have been calculated for T = 60 and v = 0.008513.
The constant parameters are p = 0.908 in the defined pension scheme and τ = 0.3 in the
defined contribution scheme.
11For determined parameters we have observed how reductions in the birth rate lead to
higher optimal legal retirement ages under the defined contribution scheme. For instance,
calculated for T = 60, τ = 0.3 and v = 0.0206, we have obtained R∗τ = 40.00 with r = 0.06
and n = 0.02, and R∗τ = 40.19 with r = 0.06 and n = 0.019.
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